Institutional Reform in India: Can we achieve big change through small measures?

Anyone who has had the pleasure of navigating the upper echelons of Indian bureaucracy has probably encountered the puzzling indo-western hybrid toilet. A true bastard child of globalization, this strange contraption is basically a western toilet with two footrests molded on the seat. The ostensible reason for the existence of this strange device is to afford the user the familiar desi comfort of squatting as they shit, while simultaneously elevating them (both literally and figuratively) above the unwashed masses who do their ablutions over a humble hole in the ground.

The first time I encountered these toilets in an IAS office, I was floored by their aptness as a metaphor for the position of many Indian public administrators: teetering awkwardly between two worlds while feeling allegiance to both, and balancing precariously on a tiny platform while trying to maintain a sense of dignity in a foul-smelling and uncomfortable room.

The structure and form of the IAS, IPS, and the majority of India’s public administration is largely a relic of the British colonial legacy. Most of the major administrative structures were inherited directly from the British; for example, the police are still organized and structured under the colonial police act of 1861. Though since Independence full autonomy has been transferred from colonial officers to an army of brown sahibs, one cannot help but question the soundness of the decision to incorporate, largely without amendment, a set of laws and system of governance that had continued subjugation rather than efficient service delivery as its overarching goal.

This is one of the many reasons people offer for the widespread corruption, institutional torpor, and sheer incompetence that seems to characterize a large portion of India’s bureaucracy. Another contingent seems convinced that all bureaucrats are simply evil souls motivated purely by greed and self-advancement. And others still will claim that the failures of India’s public administration are simply the result of human capital deficits among the ruling class.

Economists tend to analyze human behavior in terms of incentives, (admittedly, I am a student of economics). Thus, according to economic reasoning, if the vast majority of bureaucrats in an institution indulge in corruption or bribe-taking, it means that there is probably something seriously wrong with the incentives being offered to them. Sound institutions offer administrators strong incentives to perform well, deliver public goods, respect rule of law, and generally serve the people. Conversely, sound institutions are effective at catching and imposing punishment on those who violate the trust placed in them, punishments strong enough to deter such behaviors from becoming widespread and endemic.

I am not one prone to excusing the behavior of corrupt officials. But having spent a considerable amount of time working on institutional reform, and talking to bureaucrats and peons alike from various offices, I have heard a litany of compelling excuses and reasons why people in positions of administrative power are incapable of fulfilling their basic responsibilities and reduced to goondaism and criminality. The sheer prevalence of bribe-taking, corruption, and inefficiency suggests that these behaviors are born out of institutional failure rather than individual malevolence. Although many people would disagree with me, I think that claiming all of our nation’s administrators are bad by their very nature is simply wrong.

Entry to the Indian Administrative Service is truly meritocratic – individuals are selected based upon the results of the free worlds most competitive and intense civil service exam. There is no doubt that India’s civil service recruits represent the best and the brightest of each generation. The best minds from a variety of academic and professional disciplines are harvested and bestowed with an almost monarchial power over their respective spheres of influence. Yet widespread inefficiency and corruption has been an oft-lamented reality of Indian public administration since even before Independence. There are two possible explanations for this. The first is that India’s best and brightest are simply not good enough to run the country. The other is that the systems and structures in which the best and brightest are operating offer them perverse incentives not to perform to their potential..

For a country so brimming with talent and ability, the first explanation seems downright preposterous. Assuming that the second theory is indeed accurate, the logical next step is to carefully consider the various ways in which public institutions can be restructured to better provide services to their constituents. Although its tempting to simply lament the evils of “the system” and declare that no change is possible barring a revolution, this is at best unproductive and at worst counterproductive.

In spite of tremendous obstacles to wide-scale institutional reform, many organizations have made great progress increasing accountability and service delivery through relatively small and simple initiatives. For example, in collaboration with MIT Poverty Action Lab, the Rajasthan Police was able to improve service delivery by implementing seemingly small initiatives such as training and freezing of personnel transfers. Having spent a year working on that very project, I can personally attest that at the initial stages, many of involved parties (self included) were skeptical that the proposed changes would make any genuine difference, due to institutional inertia, lack of accountability, and the familiar litany of administrative grievances. Yet the data conclusively shows that the small measures actually did cause a substantial and measurable change. A number of other states are reporting initial success using e-portals as a transparent and corruption-proof way for governments to solicit tenders for public works contracts (a major source of graft), and I have also heard anecdotal reports of the successful use of participatory auditing to reduce graft in public works. Another J-PAL project is currently examining the effectiveness of institutional reform in Gujarat’s pollution auditing system.

Although none of these small-scale measures sounds particularly inspiring in their own right, I think that they are India’s greatest hope for improving governance in the short run. It is becoming very evident that public will for change is rapidly growing in this country, but it will take considerable time to consolidate that into widespread and dramatic institutional reform. In the meantime, we need to start small and take the first steps and continue to demonstrate to the public the great disparity between what is possible and what currently exists.

Since the research staff who contribute to this blog have a collective wealth of grass-roots knowledge at their disposal, I’d be interested in hearing firsthand examples of potential ways to improve or reform institutions in India that are currently not working to their potential.