Wednesday 9 April 2008

Dr. Mor's Priority Sector Paper Cont.

This morning I posted a few comments on Nachiket Mor's recent paper on priority sector norms. A few hours later, Dr. Manohar Sharma of the International Food Policy Research Institute posted some a much more astute analysis of the same paper in the comments section of that post. Out of fear that Dr. Sharma's excellent insights will go unread, I am reposting them here.

The paper makes an important point, namely that for marginal farmers and landless labourers, human labour is a key production input, and “consumption” loans that finance the upkeep this productive input are conceptually no different than production” loans that finance farm machinery or fertilizers. For this reason, they ought to, as Dr. Nachiket Mor suggests, qualify as Direct Finance to Agriculture (DFA) under Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) priority sector lending directive.

Notwithstanding the above, I have one central comment on the paper: it is not quite clear to me how merely re-classifying consumption loans as DFA, by itself, provides greater incentives for commercial banks to increase net lending to the agricultural sector in general or to marginal farmers/landless labourers in particular.

I raise this point for two reasons: First, I note that under current RBI regulation, interest rate on loans under Rs 200,000 are capped at the bank’s prime lending rate. Individual loans to marginal farmers/landless labourers are thus most likely to be amounts small enough to be subject to this regulatory interest rate cap. Also, per unit transactions cost for lenders is likely to be relatively high for such loan sizes. Hence it is not all that clear whether banks will sufficiently recoup costs incurred in lending small amounts to marginal farmers and landless labourers. The case that Dr. Mor makes would be considerably strengthened if the paper further fleshed out reasons why commercial banks -- currently unwilling to fulfil their DFA obligations even by lending to large farmers in amounts not subject interest rate caps -- will suddenly turn around to service much smaller consumption loans to marginal farmers simply because they are now counted as DFA. Second, commercial banks (like ICICI) are already using a variety of innovative financial instruments to partner with MFIs that provide general-purpose loans to poor rural households either directly or through Self Help Groups (SHGs). I am sure that Dr. Mor himself played a critical role in
some of these innovations. From the point of view of commercial banks, these arrangements are rather nice: the loans qualify as priority sector lending and reach relatively poor households, but at the same time avoid interest rate caps and also shift a significant chunk of administrative costs to the MFIs. So, this leads me to my second question: how will merely redefining this financial portfolio as DFA lead to its net enlargement? Would it not, by simple arithmetic, result in equivalent reduction loans classified as non-DFA credit?



Thus, in both cases, I would suggest that the paper address the additionally factor a little more clearly.

1 comments:

Nil said...

I read Dr Mor's piece with great interest. The idea of substitutability between consumption loan for marginal farmer vis-à-vis loans for animals and machine; and its impact on agricultural productivity is great. From an outsider perspective I have some questions/thought. Some of these might sounds trivial, which is okay, given my limited knowledge on this area.



First, Dr Mor has mentioned that the banks upon failing their target lending to the priority sector have to perk the shortfall amount to NABARD at a much lesser rate of interest. Is there any way the banks can trade among themselves where the banks which have achieved priority sector lending (may be with better rural network) can buy some of the loan amount from the banks which are finding it hard to fulfill their target. The trading rate will obviously hover between 6 and 10 percent; and both the parties gain – something in the line of Ronald Coase law.



Second, States with highest labor days per hectare are Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Orissa. West Bengal makes sense as they have done land reform program. Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh also make sense as these are the States with lower State GDP; with prevalence of larger number of farm labors. What about Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. Does it tell us anything about skewed income distribution in these two States?



Third, if I understand correctly there is a hump in the mode of loan repayment - most part of loan repayment happens immediately post harvest. Since market price tend to be less just immediately after the harvest season with most farmers trying to sell at the same time, the pay off to the farmers and hence probability of loan default might increase. Why can’t the bank step in here? I mean it makes sense for banks to invest in warehouse to hoard grain stocks and release the same when the market price stabilizes. In that way both the bank and the farmers gain. Banks can actually benefit from this arbitrage.

These are few observations which come to my mind at this moment